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LINING-UP AT THE BORDER: RENEWING THE
CALL FOR A CANADA-U.S. INSOLVENCY
CONVENTION IN THE 21ST CENTURY
*

One must wonder why the goals of economic efficiency and creditor
protection have not driven more nations to reach a workable bank1
ruptcy treaty or convention.

I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Need
When Bramalea Limited, a major Canadian-based real estate
developer, encountered financial difficulties in the early 1990s, it was
confronted with a myriad of international and procedural legal issues.2 Since the corporation had assets and creditors in both Canada
and the United States, Bramalea struggled to choose which country—
or both—to file its initial assignment in bankruptcy in order to obtain
stays of proceedings against its subsidiaries pending the company’s financial reorganization.3 Bramalea’s final decision involved extensive
consultation with U.S. counsel and consideration of many diverse and
complex financial options. Bramalea assessed the legal efficacy of
each of the following: (1) commencing a single reorganization proceeding under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the
“Code”);4 (2) filing separate proceedings for each subsidiary in its respective country; (3) abstaining from U.S. jurisdiction due to on-going
Copyright © 2000 by Mike Perry.
* The preparation of this note coincides with advocacy of the proclamation of the year
2000 as a year of “Jubilee” in which the debts of developing nations would be forgiven. See Leviticus 25:8-13. The author would like to thank Professor Steven L. Schwarcz for his review of
this note, and Alexander Dale, Emily Kim, and Meggan Louden for their editorial contributions.
1. David C. Cook, Prospects for a North American Bankruptcy Agreement; Les Prospects
pour une Convention de la Faillite en Americque due Nord; Los Prospectos para un Convenio de
Quiebra de Norte America, 2 SW. J. OF L. & TRADE AM. 81, 81 (1995).
2. For details of the insolvency of Bramalea Limited, see E. Bruce Leonard & R. Gordon
Marantz, Practical Strategies in Workouts and Insolvencies in Canada, in DEALING WITH
FOREIGN WORKOUTS AND INSOLVENCIES: 1993 PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR LENDERS AND
INVESTORS, 291, 332-37 (Practicing Law Institute, 1993); Cook, supra note 1, at 81-82.
3. See Cook, supra note 1.
4. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1501 (1994).
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processes back in Canada;5 and (4) initiating a proceeding under section 304 of the Code6 to administer its bankruptcy in the United
States as ancillary to a foreign proceeding. Any solution involving
multiple, cross-border filings risked fragmenting Bramalea’s financial
reorganization and all of the company’s options had severe negative
ramifications due to the unique treatment of secured creditors under
Canadian and U.S. bankruptcy law.7
While Bramalea Limited was ultimately restructured effectively,8
the procedural and international legal dilemmas it encountered discourage Canadian and U.S. cross-border investment and exemplify
both the ambiguity for creditors and the disincentive to financial reorganization inherent in the variation of bankruptcy legislation in
Canada and the United States. “The Bramalea reorganization [for
example]. . .was perceived to involve an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the Canadian court in a manner inconsistent with U.S.
bankruptcy policy . . . .”9 These distinctions in Canadian and U.S.
bankruptcy law not only impede the realization of the potential of
bilateral trade between the two nations but render the nature of insolvency in North America anomalous within the international economic order of the 21st century.10 The realization of an insolvency
treaty between Canada and the United States is long overdue.
Uniformity of bankruptcy laws as a prerequisite for effective
economic integration between states has been recognized in America
since the time of the thirteen colonies.11 The expansion of U.S. credit
abroad and stimulation of foreign investment in the United States at
the turn of the 19th Century have been attributed to producing the
5. See id. § 305(a)(2)(A) (permitting debtors to abstain from its application where
equivalent foreign proceedings have been initiated).
6. Id. § 304. The availability of § 304 of the Code to Canadian debtors is uncertain. See
Leonard & Marantz, supra note 2, at 325-29.
7. For example, “Canada has no ‘cram-down’ law similar to that in the United States. Secured creditors, rather than constituting a separate class, may be grouped together provided
they have a ‘commonality of interest’ in the same class.” Leonard & Marantz, supra note 2, at
335.
8. See id. at 345.
9. Id. at 347.
10. “International insolvencies are presently resolved through judicially supervised, ad hoc
arrangements and various doctrines recognizing foreign judgments and representatives.” Cook,
supra note 1, at 84.
11. See id. at 83. “The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately
connected with the regulation of commerce and will prevent so many frauds . . . that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question.” THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison), quoted in Rhett Frimet, The Birth of Bankruptcy in the United States, 96 COM. L.J. 160, 161
(1991).
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passage of the original U.S. uniform Bankruptcy Act. The first Bankruptcy Act provided legislative assurances to international creditors
that their interests would receive bankruptcy protection equal to
creditors in the United States.12 Similarly today, without a convention
for bankruptcy between Canada and the United States, creditors in
each jurisdiction may choose to refrain from cross-border investment
rather than risk discriminatory treatment under the other’s bankruptcy laws.13 “The pursuit of international business opportunities often involves the laws and citizens of many countries. When opportunities go awry, the courts of one or more of those countries may have
to become involved in the litigation which follows.”14
As bankruptcy is an inevitable reality of modern business, the
harmonization of its principles between comparable trading nations is
increasingly considered a hallmark of the efficiency and sophistication
of nations’ capacities to engage in international commerce.15 Given
the extent of cross-border trade between Canada and the United
States, 16 the need is great for the advanced legislative and judicial coordination of insolvency matters in the form of a standardized, transnational framework designed to minimize the resultant legal complexities and potential economic harm of commercial endeavors that
encounter financial difficulty.17 While Canada and the United States
continue to adjust to the North American Free Trade Agreement
(“NAFTA”)18 market early this century, however, the economic wisdom prevalent at the time of the American commercial union appears
not to have endured.

12. See 45 Cong. Rec. 2273 (1910), in Kurt H. Nadelmann, Concurrent Bankruptcies and
Creditor Equality in the Americas, 96 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 185 (1948).
13. See id.
14. GST Telecommunications, Inc. v. Provenzano, Vancouver [Jan. 14, 2000] A992626 Carswell BC 355 (Can.).
15. See Anne Neilson et al., The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat: Principles to Facilitate the Resolution of International Insolvencies, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 533, 535-36 (1996).
16. For example, in 1998, Canada’s exports to the United States totaled $297.2B (80.7% of
Canada’s exports) and it imported $266.2 billion from the United States (74.7% of Canada imports). See CanadExport, Trade News Bulletin. Canadian Trade Commissioner Service (Ottawa, 1999) (visited Feb. 14, 2000) <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/news/newsltr/canex/
menu.htm>. Conversely, the United States’ trade balance for exports, domestic and foreign,
with Canada totaled over $1.5T in 1997 and its trade balance for general imports with Canada
was in excess of $1.68T. See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States,
800-01 (1998).
17. See Neilson et al., supra note 15, at 536-37.
18. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M.
296, 32 I.L.M. 605.
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Despite long-time recognition by the courts in both Canada and
the United States that “a framework of general privileges should be
agreed upon to address . . . issues that are likely to arise in connection
with cross-border insolvency proceedings,”19 the conclusion of a Canada-U.S. insolvency convention has proved illusive.20 Canada and the
United States have yet to initiate negotiations for a North American
agreement on bankruptcy21 despite the advent of the new millennium
and its potential for legal innovation and global economic renewal.22
A Canada-U.S. bankruptcy treaty has been advocated for over
fifty years,23 however “most people think such agreements are beneficial . . . few think they are attainable.”24 Defiant of contemporary
governmental and popular ambivalence, the globalization of international capital and consumer markets—through the evolving influence
of international economic law with the domestic financial policies of

19. Order Approving the Stipulation Regarding Cross-Border Insolvency Protocol, Everfresh, infra note 92; see also the prophetic advocacy of Justice Nesbitt in 1905:
I think it is a very great pity that there should not be some legislation immediately
regulating many questions of international law . . . between Canada and the United
States. The growing interchange of business, owing to the geographical continuity,
makes it very important that there should be well defined rules applicable to both
countries . . . . Take for instance, bankruptcy, receivership and administrations.
Justice Nesbitt, 1905 Universal Congress of Lawyers & Jurists 266, reprinted in DALHUISEN ON
INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY D-18 (6th ed. 1986). For later academic advocacy of the potential benefits of a bilateral bankruptcy treaty, see Kurt H. Nadelmann, International Bankruptcy Law: Its Present Status, 5 U. TORONTO L.J. 324, 351 (1944).
20. “The United States is not a party to any bilateral bankruptcy treaties.” Robert K.
Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 n.18
(1997).
21. See Cook, supra note 1, at 18. As recently as 1994, however, the American Law Institute did approve the development of a model agreement to govern the insolvencies of Canadian
and U.S. cross-border commercial and financial institutions, see id., and while a Canada-U.S.
treaty on insolvency was ultimately concluded in 1976, see United States of America – Canada
Bankruptcy Treaty, Oct. 29, 1979, U.S.-Canada, reprinted in DALHUISEN ON INTERNATIONAL
INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY App. D (6th ed. 1986), the agreement was never signed nor intended to be North American in scope.
22. For a detailed elaboration of bankruptcy issues between Canada and the United States
in the 1990s, see E. Bruce Leonard & R. Gordon Marantz, Cross Border Issues Between the
United States and Canada, in INTERNATIONAL BANKRUPTCIES: DEVELOPING PRACTICAL
STRATEGIES 439 (Practicing Law Institute, 1992).
23. See Nadelmann, supra note 19.
24. Cook, supra note 1, at 82. For example, in response to a question on his opinion of a
general bankruptcy code, that would recognize and give effect to general insolvency principles
and leave the details of the proceedings each particular state, Henry Weaton stated that “[s]uch
an international bankruptcy code would doubtless be beneficial; but I should think that the difficulties in establishing it by general consent would be found almost insuperable.” Interview
with Henry Weaton, in Kurt H. Nadelmann, An International Bankruptcy Code: New Thoughts
on an Old Idea, 10 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 70, 74 (1961).
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states25 —will require the harmonization early this century of the ad
26
27
hoc, inconsistent, wasteful, and often prohibitively expensive Canadian and U.S. cross-border insolvency reality.
B. The Possibility
International bankruptcy is a complex area of the law, which is
“underdeveloped and inconsistent at best.”28 While few in number,29
contemporary cross-border insolvency treaties currently in force tend
to be among states that share special regional characteristics. Like
Canada and the United States, states currently bound by bankruptcy
conventions are geographically proximate and possess commonalties
in their legal traditions, cultural identities, linguistic compositions,
and dominant political institutions.30 The integration of the two nations’ trade infrastructures and their consistent collaboration in the
economic realm demonstrate that the affinity of the elements of nationhood indicative of states’ amenability to bilateral cooperation on

25. See GATT Secretariat, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, MTN/FA/Corr. 1 (Dec. 15, 1993) (“Final Act”). For example, the
Final Act provides for the review of the domestic trade and economic policies of World Trade
Organization member states through the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. See id. at
MTN/FAII-A3. “[T]he review mechanism will enable the regular collective appreciation and
evaluation by the Ministerial Conference of the full range of individual Members’ trade policies
and practices and their impact on the functioning of the multilateral trading system.” Id. at
§A(I).
26. See In re Olympia & York Realty Corp., Nos. 92-B-42698, 92-42702 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1992), cited in Neilson, supra note 15, at 536-37; see also Cook, supra note 1, at 82.
27. Only large corporations can afford the legal expertise necessary to negotiate and resolve transnational bankruptcies under the current Canada-U.S. regime. See Ian Fletcher,
Cross-Border Cooperation in Cases of International Insolvency: Some Recent Trends Compared,
6-7 TUL. CIV. L.F. 171, 174 (1991-92).
28. Overseas Inns v. United States, 685 F. Supp. 968, 971 (N.D. Tex. 1988), aff’d, 911 F.2d
1146 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting Stacey Allen Morales & Barbara Anne Deutsch, Bankruptcy Code
Section 304 and U.S. Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: The Tyranny of Comity, 39 BUS.
LAW. 1573, 1575 (1984)).
29. The only modern multilateral bankruptcy treaties in force as of the mid-1990s are the
Convention Between Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway and Sweden regarding Bankruptcy,
Nov. 7, 1933, 155 L.N.T.S. 133 (“Nordic Convention of 1933”), the Treaties on Private International Law, 37 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 95 (1943) (“Montevideo Treaties of 1889 and 1940”), the
Convention on Private International Law, Feb. 20, 1928, 86 L.N.T.S. 246 (“Havana Convention
of 1928”), the Convention on Private International Law, Feb. 20, 1928, 86 L.N.T.S. 246, 362
(“Bustamante Code”), and Council of Europe, European Convention on Certain International
Aspects of Bankruptcy, June 5, 1990 (“Istanbul Convention”) reprinted in IAN F. FLETCHER,
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: COMPARATIVE DIMENSIONS 297-308 (1990); see also Ian F.
Fletcher, International Insolvency: A Case Study and Treatment 27 Int’l Law 429, 437 (1993)
[hereinafter Fletcher, Case Study]; Cook, supra note 1, at 85-93.
30. See Fletcher, Case Study, supra note 29.
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insolvency characterize the relationship of Canada and the United
States.31 While sharing the requisite socioeconomic features intrinsic
to North American geography such as a common market system, legal tradition, and single, dominant language, the only effort toward a
bankruptcy convention for Canada and the United States was undertaken more than 20 years ago.32
Since this time, significant economic developments within and
between Canada and the United States have emerged to renew the
desirability—if not urgency—of uniform cross-border bankruptcy
proceedings.33 Canada has radically revised its domestic bankruptcy
laws;34 Canada and the United States have ratified the NAFTA treaty;
and the annual number of bankruptcies in both jurisdictions is plentiful.35 While the draft insolvency treaty attempted by Canada and the
United States in 1970 may serve as a disheartening precedent due to
its ultimate failure to be ratified, the existence of even this draft
31. See, e.g., Can.-U.S. Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, Apr. 15, 1972, 11 I.L.M.
694; Can.-U.S. Agreement on Reciprocal Fishing Privileges in Certain Areas Off Their Coasts,
June 15, 1973, 916 U.N.T.S. 237; Can.-U.S. Free-Trade Agreement, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1998)
(“FTA”); NAFTA, supra note 18. Given the level of cooperation and concession required by
the two countries to conclude these complex and comprehensive conventions, it is curious that a
bilateral insolvency treaty proves illusive. “Efforts to resolve the conflict through the treaty
process have proven surprisingly difficult; even after NAFTA and successful GATT negotiations, Canada and the United States have been unable to come to a bankruptcy accord.” John
K. Londot, Notes & Comment: Handling Priority Rules Conflicts in International Bankruptcy:
Assessing the International Bar Association’s Concordat, 13 BANK. DEV. J. 163, 165 (1996).
32. There was a bona fide attempt at a bilateral insolvency treaty in the mid-1970s. See
United States of America – Canada Bankruptcy Treaty, supra note 21.
33. For a description of the impact of the FTA on cross-border insolvency in Canada and
the United States, see Jeffrey Davis, Bankruptcy, Banking, Free Trade, and Canada’s Refusal to
Modernize its Business Rescue Law, 26 TEX. INT’L L.J. 253, 262-65 (1991).
34. In 1992, the Canadian Bankruptcy Act became the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.
See Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C, ch. C-3 (1992) (Can.). For further analysis of the
revisions Canada’s bankruptcy law contained in the B.I.A., see R. Gordon Marantz et al., The
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act - The New Look After Forty Years, 8 B.F.L.R. 195 (1993). The
amendments of the transformation attempted to protect the rights of debtors and the investments of secured creditors and placed extensive emphasis on attempts at reorganization rather
than liquidation of the debtor’s assets. See id.
35. Business bankruptcies in the United States:
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
67,714
72,650
66,428
56,748
51,288
52,938
53,993
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, supra note 16, at 555.
Business bankruptcies in Canada:
Jan. – Sept., 1997
Jan. – Sept., 1998
7,555
8,096
Source: Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, Business Bankruptcies (Ottawa: Industry
Canada, 1999) )(visited Feb. 14, 2000) <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/br01104e.html>.
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model is instructive of the character that a new agreement could assume—or avoid—and demonstrates the feasibility of realizing a bilateral insolvency convention in the immediate future. To this end, a
preliminary examination of the fundamental philosophical underpinnings of international insolvency is required.
C. The Difficulty: Assets, Universality, and Territorial Sovereignty
The illusory character of the principle of universality in crossborder insolvency proceedings has long plagued the development of a
viable Canada-U.S. agreement. Regardless of the utility of a CanadaU.S. insolvency convention, the fact that the United States has a reputation for being the “least cooperative of the major trading states”36
represents a pragmatic impediment of international political orientation resistant to the realization of a cross-border treaty. The United
States advanced a more universal approach to bankruptcy administration in the late 1970s, however, with the passage of legislation that acknowledged and recognized foreign bankruptcy proceedings and representatives at U.S. law.
Section 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code states:
(a) A case ancillary to a foreign proceeding is commenced by the
filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under this section
by a foreign representative . . .
(c) In determining whether to grant relief. . .the court shall be
guided by what will best assure an economical and expeditious
administration of such estate, consistent with—
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims . . .
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against
prejudice and inconvenience in the processing of claims in
such foreign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions . . .
(4) distribution of proceeds . . . substantially in accordance
with the order prescribed by this title; [and]
37
(5) comity . . .

The enactment of section 304 demonstrated a desire by the
United States to foster bilateral mutuality in cross-border insolvency.38 The complimentary and reciprocal spirit of section 304 must
36. Mary E. Knecht, The ‘Drapery of Illusion’ of Section 304—What Lurks Beneath: Territoriality in the Judicial Application of Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, 13 U. PA. J. INT’L
BUS. L. 287, 291 (1992).
37. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1994).
38. See Donald T. Trautman, Foreign Creditors in American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 29
HARV. INT’L L.J. 49, 50 (1988).
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be resurrected and accentuated as indicative of U.S. initiative toward
universality if a Canada-U.S. bankruptcy convention is to be concluded.39 A fundamental source of uncertainty threatening the conclusion of a bilateral treaty from the outset is that while the United
States has a relatively consistent legal regime governing the recognition of foreign bankruptcy proceedings under section 304 of the
Code, Canada’s statutory observance of international insolvency
claims remains undefined.40 Accordingly, the strict adherence of both
nations to traditional principles of judicial sovereignty is the primary
obstacle to the attainment of a Canada-U.S. insolvency treaty and
must be abandoned, or at least reoriented if an agreement is ever to
be reached.
As assets in bilateral insolvencies will invariably be situated in
Canada, the United States, or both, cross-border competition between territorial sovereignty and asset administration in bankruptcy
may be resolved in three ways:
(i)
the host country cedes jurisdiction to the bankruptcy laws
of the bankrupt’s home nation. American bankruptcy
laws would govern American bankrupts in Canada and
vice-versa;

39. The universal character of section 304 of the Code inspired the International Bar Association to draft a the Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act in 1988, which assigned a
considerable amount of administrative power over transnational insolvency proceedings to the
national courts of each nation party. See Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act, reprinted in John A. Barrett & Timothy E. Powers, Proposal for Consultative Draft of Model International Insolvency Co-operation Act for Adoption by Domestic Legislation With or Without
Modification, 17 INT’L BUS. LAW. 323, 323 (1989).
Enthusiasm for the potential of section 304 to provide a basis for increased bankruptcy
harmonization between Canada and the United States must be tempered, however, as section
304 has been criticized for being territorialistic at best—and imperialistic at worst—in its approach to international bankruptcies. See Cook, supra note 1, at 112-13; Michael P. Bigelow,
Case Comment, Public Policy Concerns Prevent Application of Comity to Foreign Bankruptcy
Proceedings That Discriminate Against Tax Obligations Owed to the United States Government:
Overseas Inns S.A. P.A. v. United States, 911 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1990), 24 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 571 (1991).
The section has also been applied in a manner adverse to the end of homogeneity of transnational bankruptcy proceedings in that Canadian bankruptcy judgments have recently been
deferred under section 304, subordinated to the doctrine of comity. See Clarkson Co. Ltd. v.
Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1976) (U.S. court refused to allow a collateral attack on a Canadian bankruptcy judgment); Caddel v. Clairton Corp., 105 B.R. 366 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (U.S. suit
was dismissed against a Canadian bank being liquidated in Canada); Rivendell Forest Prods.,
Ltd., v. Canadian Forest Prods., Ltd., 810 F.Supp 1116 (D. Colo. 1993) (U.S. court refused to
exercise jurisdiction over a Sherman Act claim brought against Canadian defendants as the foreign interests were overwhelming).
40. See Cook, supra note 1, at 119.
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(ii)

the host country retains its jurisdiction over the foreign
bankrupt. American bankrupts in Canada would be
subject to Canadian bankruptcy laws and vice-versa;41 or
(iii)
both countries adopt harmonized bankruptcy proceedings.42
From nationalist and historic perspectives, it is highly unlikely
that Canada and the United States will administer their bankruptcy
regimes reciprocally or subject their bankrupt nationals to the other’s
insolvency laws given that states generally loathe to cede sovereignty.43 Since both Canada and the United States have major corporate enterprises that are situated in both countries and cross-border
insolvencies remain unregulated, the primary location of a bankrupt
does not automatically resolve conflict of law dilemmas. The first two
elements of the above matrix, while initially appealing in their simplicity, do not portray the complexity of the contemporary administration of cross-border bankruptcies in Canada and the United
States. The third option of well-defined uniform insolvency proceedings provides the only solution that can reconcile the international legal dysfunction inherent in the coexistence of bankruptcy
laws unique to Canada and the United States with the doctrine of jurisdictional sovereignty.
The economic benefits of effective and efficient transnational
bankruptcy laws are realizable only through a formalized system of
mutual administration that is attentive to the distinct interests of the
effective administration of foreign-located assets and the maintenance
of state sovereignty that compete in cross-border insolvencies. This
daunting enterprise is not predisposed to failure. The obstacle of
sovereign determinism may indeed be surmountable as the rigid
abidance of each country to strict notions of jurisdictional autonomy
in the context of transnational insolvency is primarily rhetorical, if not
now illusory; both Canada and the United States compromise their
sovereignty on a regular basis toward the resolution of bi-national

41. But see In re Olympia & York Realty Corp., Nos. 92-B-42698, 92-42702 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992), cited in Neilson, supra note 15, at 536-37 (U.S. court authorized the debtor to
take certain actions in Canada pursuant to the Code).
42. Ideally, harmonization would occur under a bilateral bankruptcy convention creating a
single administrative and adjudicative forum sensitive to the distinct legal traditions and insolvency entitlements of both nations. See Neilson et al., supra note 15.
43. See DAVID J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 227 (5th ed.
1989).
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economic disputes.44 Surrendering exclusive jurisdiction for the settlement of past economic disputes in this context provides a beneficial
precedent for undertaking a bilateral bankruptcy convention. A reconciliation of the competing interests of bankruptcy and sovereignty
in unified insolvency proceedings is available in the concept of “modified universality.”45
D. Modified Universality
A tangible application of the principle of modified universality
would include the establishment of a single and central determinative
forum for the administration and adjudication of Canadian and U.S.
cross-border insolvency proceedings. Any potential for legal hegemony or intolerable losses of jurisdictional sovereignty would be remedied by the retention by each nation of its legal jurisdiction over insolvency matters deemed ancillary to individual claims. The modified
universality approach to a harmonized insolvency regime “represents
a realistic solution to the conflict inherent in the principles of universality and territoriality. [The concept]. . .combines both principles,
maximizing the advantages and minimizing the disadvantages of
both.”46 The compromise between universality in bankruptcy law and
national sovereignty inherent in the concept of modified universality
recently provided the basis for the conclusion of an international
bankruptcy concordat instructive to Canada and the United States.
II. EXISTING ADVANCEMENTS
There have been formal bankruptcy treaties and attempts at
formal bankruptcy treaties dating back almost eight hundred years.47
International endeavors at bankruptcy treaty-making over the past
few decades, however, offer the most valuable lessons and bear the
44. For example, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter F.A.A.], ratified by both
Canada and the United States, obliges its parties to “recognize arbitral awards as binding and to
enforce them according to legal rules . . . applicable to enforcement of domestic arbitral
awards.” Jay L. Westbrook, The Coming Encounter: International Arbitration and Bankruptcy
67 MINN. L. REV. 595, 597 (1986). For recent examples of Canadian and U.S. potential for
compromise towards the conclusion of complex agreements on major, bilateral issues, see
Fletcher, Case Study, supra note 27.
45. For a well-developed thesis on the competition between universal bankruptcy law and
sovereignty, culminating in the concept of modified universality, see Mike Sigal et al., The Law
and Practice of International Insolvencies, Including a Draft Cross-Boarder Insolvency Concordat, ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 1 (1994-95).
46. Neilson et al., supra note 15, at 534.
47. See Cook, supra note 1, at 85.
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most significant consequences for the evolution of standardized insolvency relations between Canada and the United States.
A. The European Community48 Experience
The European Community (“EC”) has produced three draft
bankruptcy treaties over the past thirty years, none of which have
been ratified. Despite the fact that the member states of the EC have
been authorized to harmonize their laws since 1957, attempts at a
multilateral convention in 1970 failed because they produced an insolvency agreement too universal in substance.49
The EC’s draft Convention on Bankruptcy and Winding Up
(“Draft”) 50 established a forum court with exclusive jurisdiction in the
country where the debtor had commenced the bankruptcy proceedings, and the EC’s member’s national courts were required to recognize the forum courts’ orders unconditionally.51 Despite an amendment to the Draft in 1980 to comprise a more modified approach to
its universality52 and provide for Denmark, Ireland, and the United
Kingdom (“U.K.”) to enter the agreement, the 1980 Draft ultimately
failed to be concluded.53 Finally in 1990, a new, scaled-down draft was
prepared that applied only to liquidations and not corporate arrangements, compositions, or reorganizations.54
Although the Draft in its present form is unlikely to be accepted
by the EC and, if it is, will be of little value and application, the Draft
and the process of its development are significant. The legislatures of
many EC member states have enacted various provisions of the Draft

48. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
49. See id., art. 220, at 8; see also Muir Hunter, The Draft Bankruptcy Convention of the
European Economic Communities, 21 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 682, 693 (1972).
50. See generally John H. Farrar, The EEC Draft Convention on Bankruptcy and Winding
Up, J. BUS. L. 320 (1977).
51. The 1970 Draft was also predestined to fail as it contained many inconsistencies and
was the product of poor planning and inferior construction. See id. at 336.
52. The 1980 Draft replaced the requirement that each member adopt uniform voiding
power laws with specific conflict of laws provisions, and national courts were permitted to apply
their state’s laws when determining priorities of preferential and secured claims against property
located in the state. See Richard A. Gitlin & Evan D. Flaschen, The International Void in the
Law of Multinational Bankruptcies, 42 BUS. LAW 307, 312-13 (1987).
53. “No clear reason has emerged as to why the 1980 Draft failed,” Cook, supra note 1, at
88 n.41, despite the fact that it “presented a more ‘cautious’ approach to international bankruptcy than the 1970 Draft.” Id. at 88; see also Chin Kim & Jimmy C. Smith, International Insolvencies: An English-American Comparison With an Analysis of Proposed Solutions, 26 GEO.
WASH. J. INT’L L & ECON. 1, 25 (1992).
54. See Cook, supra note 1, at 89.
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into their national legal systems to the extent that the Draft has
achieved a degree of harmony in the European bankruptcy reality.
The adaptation of these draft-treaty provisions into the domestic laws
of states has profound implications for international law. Another
key feature of the Draft process is that its ultimate failure inspired the
cautious conclusion of the Council of Europe’s55 Convention on Cer56
tain International Aspects of Bankruptcy (“Istanbul Convention”).
As only seven states had signed the Istanbul Convention and none
had submitted it for ratification as of 1993,57 the International Bar Association (“IBA”) intensified its on-going efforts to draft a Concordat
on multinational insolvency.
B. The International Bankruptcy Concordat
In response to particularly multifarious—and excessively public—bi-national bankruptcy proceedings,58 which included an order
from a U.S. court permitting a bankrupt to take specified action in
Canada pursuant to the Code,59 and due to the ultimate undesirability
of the American Bar Association’s previous draft Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act60 (“MIICA”), the ABA under-

55. The Council of Europe is comprised of over 24 member states, including all of the 12
members of the EC. See Fletcher, Case Study, supra note 29, at 437.
56. See Istanbul Convention, supra note 29.
57. See id., art. 34, at 305. Three nations were required to ratify the Istanbul Convention
before it could even be considered binding among its accepting states. In addition, the U.K. had
given no indication of its intent to sign. See id.
58. See, e.g., Maxwell Communication Corp. v. Barclays Bank, 170 B.R. 800 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d,186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
59. See In re Olympia & York Realty Corp., Nos. 92-B-42698, 92-42702 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1992), cited in Neilson, supra note 15, at 536-37.
60. See Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act, supra note 39.
The MIICA did not address the key issues of which country under the Act would retain
primary jurisdiction over the bankruptcy’s administration, how to determine whether foreign
courts were granting substantially similar treatment as national courts to bankrupts and whether
they would grant preferences to local credit priorities. See Cook, supra note 1, at 94-95. Ultimately, the rejection of the MIICA was contradictory, for as it was considered by some observers to be too universal to overcome concerns of state sovereignty in bankruptcy proceedings,
other commentators felt that the Act only paid lip service to the bankruptcy laws of other nations. See Jay L. Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and
Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457, 485 (1991).
For further analysis of the MIICA, see Elizabeth K. Somers, The Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act: An International Proposal for Domestic Legislation, 6 AM. U.J. INT’L
L. & POL’Y 677, 688 (1991); Timothy E. Powers, The Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act: A 21st Century Proposal for International Insolvency Cooperation, reprinted in
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY
LAW 687-700 (Jacob S. Ziegel ed., 1994); Cook, supra note 1, at 93-95.
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took to draft a Concordat on international bankruptcy (“Concordat”).61 The contractual language of the Concordat responded to the
hesitancy of nations had to transfer sovereignty in the form of domestic bankruptcy jurisdiction by articulating the concept of modified
universality. The universality of centralized bilateral bankruptcy proceedings, characteristic of failed predecessor agreements—yet required to implement a cooperative regime—was respected by the
Concordat in its adoption of a centralized forum for the administration of insolvencies. The Concordat’s single forum, however, would
either harmonize the plenary bankruptcy proceedings of the contracting party states such as the filing of claims, liquidation of debt,
and distribution of assets to creditors, or operate in conjunction with
the ancillary proceedings of the individual states party to the Concordat.
As an international instrument, the Concordat’s principles of insolvency may be adapted toward the harmonization of transnational
bankruptcy proceedings regardless of the bankruptcy traditions of the
participating states. The Concordat initially appears to have prescribed universality in creating a single administrative forum with
primary responsibility for the coordination of all insolvency matters
of bankrupts with transnational ramifications62 and delegating administrative functions to the main forum to which conflicts with national
bankruptcy proceedings are deferred. Authority over filings and asset distributions, collection of non-local assets for payment of common creditors after the payment of secured and privileged claims, and
the granting of discharges subject to universal recognition is also prescribed to the main forum under the Concordat.63 The universality of
its approach to transnational insolvency administration is modified
significantly, however, as the Concordat prohibits discrimination

61. For a more detailed legislative history of the drafting of the Concordat, see generally,
the Resolution of the Council of the International Bar Association, adopted in the occasion of
its meeting in Madrid, June 1, 1996, cited in Neilson et al., supra note 15, at 537 n.20; id. at 538.
See generally Report on the Committee J Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat, cited in id. at 537
n.16 [hereinafter Report on the Concordat]; Londot, supra note 31.
A 1993 Draft Concordat was presented to the International Insolvency and Creditors’
Rights Conference in 1994 country teams from 18 nations, including Canada and the United
States, were formed to propose revisions. The contributions from the country teams and subsequent discussion culminated in the 1995 Second Revised Concordat, which was approved by the
Section on Business Law of the International Bar Association in 1995. The Association formally approved the Concordat on June 1, 1996. See id.
62. See Neilson et al., supra note 15, at 537-38.
63. See id.
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against non-local creditors64 and acknowledges the jurisdiction of secondary proceedings in granting local courts power to receive the filings for claims, liquidate debt and distribute assets to creditors, determine secured and privileged claims,65 and reconsider the orders of
the main forum upon request of the official representatives of creditors from other jurisdictions.66
While the Concordat is instructive to Canada and the United
States on the manifestation of the legalistic concept of modified universality vital to sustainable bankruptcy treaty-making, the European
67
Union Convention On Insolvency Proceedings (“EU Convention”) is
perhaps the document most relevant by analogy—and in terms of its
relative success—to the current Canada-U.S. insolvency experience.
C. The EU Convention
Although conducting business on another continent, the European Union’s (“EU”)68 economically detrimental lack of harmonized
rules for transnational insolvencies is similar to the Canada-U.S.
situation. The EU, like the FTA and NAFTA, was created primarily
to establish an internal market with the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital.69 Although the EU has adopted many multinational economic laws, it has yet to establish a protocol on transnational insolvency.70 Just as this void in bankruptcy administration is
widely considered an imperfection in the EU’s effort at economic integration,71 the lack of a bilateral insolvency convention is likewise
perceived as a fatality to the realization of the full potential of the
contemporary economic and commercial relationship between Canada and the United Sates. The conclusion of a Canada-U.S. insol64. See id.
65. See id., princ. 2(B), at 545-46. This power is more cursory as often there will be no assets remaining for common creditors after the local courts’ determination of secured and privileged interests in the bankrupt’s estates. See id. at 546.
66. See id., princ. 3(B), at 546-47.
67. See European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, opened for signature Nov.
23, 1995 17 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR WITSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] 976, 35 I.L.M. 1223 (1996).
68. See Maastricht Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Belg.-Den.-Fr.-F.R.G.-Ir.Italy-Lux.-Neth.-Port.-Spain.-U.K., Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty].
69. See id., art. B.
70. See Neilson, supra note 15, at 539.
71. “The absence of a Convention on insolvency proceedings with the framework of the
Community is viewed as a short-coming in the completion of the internal market.” Explanatory
Report to the European Union on Insolvency Proceedings (1996) 1 [hereinafter Explanatory
Report]; see also Manfred Balz, The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, 70
AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 494-528 (1996).
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vency treaty depends upon the modification of transnational insolvency laws to allow for diverse national processes. As is evident in an
analysis of the EU’s transnational insolvency history.
The EU’s member states have been striving for harmony in the
area of bankruptcy law for more than forty years72 and have a distinct
history of difficulty in reaching international bankruptcy agreements
due to their prioritization of political philosophy over international
economic harmony.73 The first proposal, finally introduced in 1980,
was universality-oriented. In other words, it offered a single bankruptcy proceeding with no allowance for diverse national processes.
The proposal failed due to the “discriminatory effect of some of its
provisions on parties located outside the EC’s borders” and its resultant inability to respect the fundamental bankruptcy principle of
equality of creditors.74 Despite its initial failure, the EU adopted a revised convention on transnational insolvency in 1989,75 which tempered its universality by recognizing the domestic bankruptcy interests of member states and the distinct principles of their respective
legal systems.
The EU Convention is
a combined model [that] has been adopted which permits local proceedings governed by their own lex fori concurus (law applicable in
the place of insolvency) to coexist with the main universal proceedings. Single universal proceedings are always possible within
the EC but the Convention does not exclude the opening of local
proceedings, controlled and governed by its rules, to protect those
76
local interests.

In other words, there are two sets of crucial proceedings in the EU
Convention;77 the main proceeding, which is instituted in the member
state where the bankrupt’s center of interest is located,78 and the secondary proceedings, which are commenced in member states where
the bankrupt has other assets.79

72. Experts began to meet in 1963 for the purposes of drafting a European convention on
bankruptcy. See Explanatory Report, supra note 71.
73. See Cook, supra note 1, at 89.
74. Fletcher, Case Study, supra note 29, at 437; see also Explanatory Report, supra note 71.
75. See “Member States Initial Bankruptcy Convention” Reuter’s News Reports (1 November 1995).
76. Explanatory Report, supra note 71, at 6.
77. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 68, arts. 3(1), 27.
78. See id.
79. See id.
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The EU Convention’s reconciliation of sovereignty and bankruptcy provides a workable model for Canada and the United States.
The fact that the EU Convention was initialed by eighty percent of
the EU member states as recently as 1995 provides additional motivation for the adoption of a Canada-U.S. agreement.80 The possibility
that both Canada and the United States may be disadvantaged by
bankruptcy laws that are not harmonized for economic efficiency and
mobility within the two primary nations of the NAFTA trading bloc
should provide additional motivation to the two parties.81 The EU
Convention’s provisions could be applicable indirectly—though not
necessarily less authoritatively—to the bankruptcy proceedings of
non-member states82 as codified principles of customary international
insolvency law, even though the EU Convention has not yet been
ratified.83 Accordingly, Canadian and U.S. bankruptcy law may be influenced—or ultimately determined by—rules of insolvency that neither country have drafted or approved.84 Canadian and U.S. national
courts could apply the EU’s rules where there is no applicable Canada-U.S. agreement.85 The international jurisprudential weight of the
EU Convention is evident in the recent incorporation of some of its
provisions into a draft model of insolvency rules considered by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law86
(“UNCITL”). Principles of transnational insolvency are emerging at
customary international law without Canadian or U.S. involvement.
Despite their lack of status as ratified treaties, the EC Draft, Concor80. The EU Convention was initialed by 80 percent of the EU member states on September 25, 1995. See “1909th Council Meeting - Justice and Home Affairs, Brussels, 19 and 20
March 1996” Reuter EU (EU) Briefing (12 April 1996).
81. The Convention was not signed by three of the 15 EU member states, including the
U.K. See id. The EU Convention is not expected to be ratified for several years. See Explanatory Report, supra note 71. But see Cook, supra note 1, at 89; Fin. Times, (20 February 1991)
20, reviewing Fletcher, Case Study, supra note 29. The main reason the Convention is not currently ratified is that the United Kingdom refused to sign it due to the controversy surrounding
its beef exports at the time. See “Beef Row Thwarts Insolvency Convention” Reuter EU
Briefing (U.K.) (30 May 1996).
82. Treaty provisions can be regarded as codification of principles of customary international law and thereby influence—if not bind—non-party states to treaty obligations. See North
Sea Continental Shelf cases, I.C.J. Rep. 1969.
83. See id.
84. The principles of customary international law are regarded as part of the U.S. Federal
law and receive the benefits of the Supremacy Clause. See Respublica v. DeLongchamps, 1 U.S.
111 (1784); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); see also Harold G.
Maier, The Authoritative Sources of Customary International Law in the United States, 10 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 450 (1989).
85. See id.
86. See Nielson et al., supra note 15, at 541.
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dat, and EU Convention provide sufficient sources of international
insolvency custom to instruct and motivate the adoption of a CanadaU.S. bankruptcy convention.
III. PRACTICALITIES AND POSSIBILITIES
The impetus for Canada and the United States to adopt a bilateral convention on insolvency may stem from symbolic, pragmatic
and prospective considerations as well.
A. Motivations: Sovereignty, Custom, and Judicial Review
Canada and the United States are resistant to cede the degree of
sovereignty necessary to conclude a bankruptcy convention. Given
this hesitancy, the fact that the two nations may have to adopt a bilateral treaty to protect against a more fundamental loss of autonomy
due to the developments in international insolvency law in Europe is
ironic.87 Emerging rules of international custom may be imputed to
the provisions of the EC Draft, Concordat, and EU Convention,
which are not reflective of the Canada-U.S. economic experience.
The opportunity for Canada and the United States to create a crossborder bankruptcy instrument of their own devise is substantially
pressing and not prohibitively daunting.
The influence of the Concordat on international insolvency law is
evident. Even though the Concordat was not intended as a surrogate
international bankruptcy treaty, the document may be considered an
authoritative source of guidance and effective interim provision for
the harmonization of transnational insolvencies.88 The Concordat’s
drafters have conceded that its provisions are amenable to implementation by national courts.89 Demonstrative of its significance as an instrument of international insolvency law, the Concordat was applied
judicially prior to its adoption by the IBA.90 More significantly, it has
already been applied in cross-border insolvency litigation between
Canada and the United States.
87. Given the social, political and cultural similarities between the two countries, a loss of
sovereignty by one to the other may be regarded—rightly or wrongly—as less of a significant
cessation of sovereign integrity than the influence of Canada and the United States’ domestic
insolvency regimes by the law and public policy decision of western European nations.
88. See Report on the Concordat, supra note 61, at 2.
89. See id.
90. See In re Hackett, 184 B.R. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). The Court cited the Concordat as an
initiative “serving to give guidance for the treatment of cross-border [insolvency] problems.”
Id. at 659. The Court’s conclusions were “supported by the facts and law. . . [and] the outcome
was consistent with the principles developed in the Concordat.” Id.
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The case of In re Everfresh Beverages, Inc, (“Everfresh Beverages”) involved a bankrupt U.S. corporation with operations in both
the United States and Canada.91 The corporation, Everfresh, encountered financial difficulties and filed reorganization proceedings concurrently under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and pursuant to the B.I.A. in Canada. During the proceedings, both the
Ontario Court of Justice and the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of New York issued orders approving a stipulation of the cross-border insolvency protocol to govern the bankrupt’s
administration.92 The stipulation was consistent with—and almost
identical to—many of the provisions of the Concordat.93
The application of the Concordat to Canada-U.S. bankruptcies
demonstrates its influence in Canadian and U.S. law, despite the acquiescence of both countries toward the Concordat as a source of international law. The result in Everfresh Beverages challenges the role
of national courts in international law and raises questions about the
applicability of unsigned, unratified international legal conventions to
domestic litigation, and the legitimacy of what was arguably de facto
ratification of a non-ratified treaty by a national judiciary. Issues of
judicial review subordinate concerns of sovereignty in this context
and provide further motivation for a Canada-U.S. bankruptcy convention.94

91. Court File No. 32-077879 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div. 1995).
92. See Order Approving the Stipulation Regarding Cross-Border Insolvency Protocol, In
re Everfresh Beverages, Inc., No. 95-B-4545-06 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) [hereinafter U.S. Stipulation]; Order Approving Cross-Border Insolvency Protocol, In re Everfresh Beverages, Inc.,
Court File No. 32-077978 (Ont. Crt. Gen. Div. 1995) [hereinafter Canadian Stipulation].
The stipulation essentially created two plenary proceedings to administer jointly Everfresh’s assets in Canada and the United States, consistent with the practice specifically envisioned in Principle 4 of the Concordat. See Report on the Concordat supra note 61, at 11. In
issuing the order that approved the stipulation, the Court expressed its intent “to protect the
interests of all creditors of Everfresh (in a situation where there is more than one plenary forum
and no main forum as provided for in Principle 4 of the Concordat) wherever located and to
protect the integrity of the process by which the Chapter 11 case and the Canadian processing is
administered.” Canadian Stipulation; U.S. Stipulation, supra. at 6.
93. The stipulation was consistent with—if not striking similar to—Principles 3(A), (C) and
(D), 4(A),(B), (C), (D), (E) and (F), 5, 7, 8, 14(A), of the Concordat. See Report on the Concordat, supra note 61.
94. The stipulation was extensive and detailed, prescribing substantive aspects of the insolvency procedure to be used by the parties. The order, inter alia, determined the legal jurisdiction of the process to be used in administering the insolvency, conferred the rights of the parties
to appear at specified stages in the procedure, and compelled the parties to issue notices and
adhere to approval mechanism for financial transactions. See Canadian Stipulation, supra note
92; U.S. Stipulation, supra note 92.
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The domestic laws of many European nations have adopted the
EC Draft, which is evidence of the state practice and opinio juris sufficient to fashion international law at custom.95 Moreover, international treaties such as the Concordat and the EU Convention exist at
varying stages of ratification, so the terms of these agreements may
also be regarded as principles of customary international law. Not
only may custom as codified in treaties be applied universally—and
therefore bind states even though they may not be parties to treaties—but, more directly, customary international law is considered
the equivalent of U.S. federal law in North America.96 Bankruptcy in
both Canada and the United States is a matter of federal jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the principles of international insolvency law may already bind Canada and the United States, a state of affairs that necessitates that a convention be concluded if sovereignty in cross-border
bankruptcy is to be maintained. Express domestic legislation and
positive bilateral treaty provisions can insulate states from the rules of
customary international law.97
A bilateral agreement would be self-contained at law and insulated from customary international rules, scrutiny of foreign standards developed abroad, and adjudication under multinational treaty
obligations such as the Foreign Awards Arbitration (“FAA”) panel .98
A well-delineated, uniquely Canada-U.S. bankruptcy instrument
would minimize concerns of sovereignty by eliminating the adjudication of Canadian and U.S. bankruptcy by general, multinational dispute-settlement mechanisms. The adoption of a highly refined, bilateral insolvency convention created specifically for the Canada-U.S.
situation would undermine the multinational FAA as a potential, or
even legitimate, forum for the resolution of Canadian and U.S. insol-

95. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10; North Sea cases, supra note
81.
96. See generally cases, supra note 83.
97. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 2 L.Ed. 208 (1804).
98. See F.A.A., supra note 44.
Canadian and U.S. bankruptcy cases have been adjudicated under the F.A.A. and its decisions have been enforced domestically by the courts of both countries. For analysis of foreign
arbitral awards under the U.S. bankruptcy law, see Fred Neufeld, Enforcement of Contractual
Arbitration Agreements Under the Bankruptcy Code, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 525 (1991); Melinda J.
Massoff, Authority of United States Bankruptcy Courts to Stay International Arbitral Proceedings, 11 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 148 (1987); Hakan Berglin, The Application in United States
Courts of the Public Policy Provision of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 4 DICK. J. INT’L L. 167 (1986).
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vency cases.99 Such a bilateral insolvency convention would render
the FAA a redundant and prohibitively general arbitration mechanism. Conflict of laws issues and propriety of forum choices that currently arise from the multiplicity of fora for the resolution of Canadian and U.S. insolvencies would be eliminated because insolvency
disputes would be governed bilaterally and would be removed from
the initial purview of international law.100
The FAA, NAFTA, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (“GATT”) all provide alternatives to filing bankruptcy proceeding in Canadian or U.S. domestic courts.101 The FAA, NAFTA,
and the GATT each contain refined dispute-settlement mechanisms
theoretically amenable to binding insolvency administration,102 however, the potential use of these institutions, coupled with states’ preference for the private resolution of disputes, should encourage the establishment of a Canada-U.S. convention that would privately and
autonomously administer bankruptcies under law agreed upon by
both countries.103 The availability of precedents for bilateral bankruptcy, the clear motivation for Canada and the United States to conclude an agreement, and the amenability of the legal, geographic and
cultural circumstances requisite to an effective harmonization of insolvency provisions are factors that make a Canada-U.S. insolvency
treaty attainable.
B. Practicalities, Similarities, and Realities
Given the great overall similarity between Canadian bankruptcy
law and the the [sic.] U.S. Bankruptcy Code, a difference in priority
for garnishor/judgment creditors as prescribed by Canadian bank99. For example, are arbitrations under the F.A.A. stayed pending reorganization under
the U.S. Code as is the commencement of court proceedings? Authority is split. See Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir. 1975), aff’d 377 F.Supp. 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1974)
(bankruptcy courts’ stays of arbitration proceedings cannot be effective without personal jurisdiction over creditors); but see In re Springer-Penguin, 74 B.R. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (movant’s
application for stay pending arbitration granted; respondent’s dismissal on basis of res judicata
or collateral estoppel denied).
100. See id.
101. See General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, 61 Stat. 814, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter
GATT]. A complainant state may initiate the resolution of a dispute over a matter of general
trade by the GATT Council, which can issue a ruling binding upon the disputing nations. See
Jeffery P. Bialos & Deborah E. Siegel, Dispute Resolution Under the NAFTA: The Newer and
Improved Model, 27 INT’L LAW 603, 604-5 (1993).
102. The practical availability of these fora is diminished, however, by the fact that no private actions may be brought under the GATT or NAFTA. See Bialos & Siegel, supra note 100,
at 615-19.
103. See Cook, supra note 1, at 119.
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ruptcy law certainly does not appear to be fundamentally unfair or
104
‘repugnant’ to U.S. notions of justice.

The distinctions between Canadian and U.S. bankruptcy laws
have meant that judicially improvised solutions have traditionally
remedied cross-border corporations’ insolvencies.105 While Canadian
and U.S. judiciaries have distinguished their insolvency laws on a
case-by-case basis as a way to prevent individual bankruptcy agreements that they oppose, the two nations’ legal regimes are complimentary to the extent that their bankruptcies and representatives
enjoy mutual recognition.106 American courts have deemed that U.S.
creditors would not endure any inconvenience if forced to litigate
their claims in Canada and receive just treatments of their claims as
both Canadian and U.S. bankruptcy laws provide financial renewal
for debtors following discharge, as well as equality of distribution of
the assets of debtors among their creditors.107 The mutual recognition
of initial proceedings is founded upon the inherent similarities of both
the procedural and substantive aspects of Canadian and U.S. insolvency law, and demonstrates the amenability of the two systems’ reconciliation in the form of a joint bankruptcy convention. The inherent likeness of Canadian and U.S. bankruptcy principles is evident in
the particulars of the more significant provisions of their domestic insolvency laws.
1. Initial Proceedings and Voluntariness. In both Canada and
the United States, voluntary insolvency proceedings are commenced
by filing a petition for bankruptcy with the court of competent
jurisdiction. The filing of a Canadian ‘proposal’ under the BIA is
akin to submitting a ‘plan for reorganization’ under Chapter 11 of the
While under Canadian jurisdiction
U.S. Bankruptcy Code.108
creditors must demonstrate that debtors have committed one—or

104. Charles D. Booth, Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: An Analysis and Critique of the
Inconsistent Approaches of United States Courts, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 135, 188 (1992).
105. See Cook, supra note 1, at 109. The lack of discernible precedents makes cross-border
insolvency law unclear, which causes economic and legal instability as corporations cannot adequately plan for the contingency of bankruptcy. See id.
106. See id.
107. See United States of America – Canada Bankruptcy Treaty, infra note 21. Ironically,
the Court in Toga, see infra note 143, proceeded to deny the trustee’s petition on the territorial
basis that in the United States a creditor would have a secured interest by virtue of the perfected judgment whereas in Canada the creditor would be an ‘ordinary’ creditor.
108. See Davis, supra note 33, at 259.
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several—enumerated ‘act(s) of bankruptcy.’109 On the other hand, the
Code does not require creditors to fulfill certain conditions in order
for creditors to commence involuntary proceedings.110 Both countries
grant secured creditors top priority in the division of the assets of
their debtors’ estates.111
Harmonization of the two nations’ involuntary bankruptcy laws
would not be a fatal impediment to a bilateral convention because the
filing of a reorganization proposal in Canada stays involuntary liquidation proceedings, and also because the Code permits a bankrupt
governed by Chapter 7 debtor to become a Chapter 11 debtor.112 Any
differences in procedural technicalities, such as the number of claimants required to file a petition, the amount of their claims, or the conduct of the debtor apparent in the initial proceedings of Canadian and
U.S. bankruptcy law, are reconciled by the similarity in the more important provisions of debtor reorganization. For instance, both countries’ laws permit conversion of a bankruptcy’s consequences from
liquidation to reorganization.113
2. Reorganization. Both Canadian and U.S. bankruptcy laws
permit the officers of debtors’ corporations to retain their capacities
as managers and to preside over reorganizations. While U.S. law
permits debtor-management of reorganizations until a trustee may be
appointed,114 however Canada’s BIA assumes corporate asset management by debtors, dictating that trustees be appointed “when necessary in the interests of the estate.”115 This contrast may contribute
to the complexity and conflict in contemporary cross-border bankruptcy as debtors seek the jurisdiction in which they will retain access
to their assets while creditors vie for effective control and protection
of their investments.
109. Acts of bankruptcy for the purposes of involuntary proceedings include ceasing to meet
liabilities as they become due, making fraudulent conveyances or preferences, departing the jurisdiction with the intent of defeating creditors, giving notice of the intent to withhold payments,
and defaulting under any provision of a proposal. See Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act § 42(1)
(Can.).
110. See id. at § 43(1).
111. See Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Can.); 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1501 (1994).
112. Compare Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act § 50.4 (Can.) with 11 U.S.C. § 706(a) (1994).
113. See Cook, supra note 1, at 103.
114. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1107 (1994). Trustees may be appointed at anytime after the
commencement of a case, but this appointment must come before confirmation of a plan and
can only be ordered upon a showing of misconduct on the part of the debtor’s managers. See id.
at § 1104.
115. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C., ch. C-3 § 30(1)(c) (1992) (Can.).
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Insufficient data exist to determine whether debtors and creditors enjoy tangible advantages under each country’s respective reorganization provisions.116 The standardization of the status of debtors
in the corporate reorganization process would ameliorate greatly the
divisive calculus required to determine the optimum venue which
may be a contributing factor to the conflict of current Canada-U.S.
bankruptcy proceedings.
3. Stays. That filing for bankruptcy stays alternative collection
proceedings by creditors is a principle varied only marginally by
Canada and the United States.117 Stays of proceedings in both
countries preclude creditors from seizing inventories or collecting on
receivables but allow debtors to continue to dispose of inventory and
collect on receivables in the courses of reorganizations.118
The primary distinction of stays between the two countries is that
Canadian debtors may use cash collateral without judicial approval,119
whereas the U.S. Code confers superiority to creditors when debtors’
protections of assets prove inadequate;120 debtors and/or trustees must
obtain judicial consent prior to cash financial transactions.121 This
variation in the Canadian and U.S. law of stays in bankruptcy proceedings does not prevent a bilateral insolvency convention since
such procedural variations may be retained in ancillary processes.
4. Proposals. Both Canada and the United States require
creditor and judicial approval of corporate reorganizations and each
country empowers creditors and debtors to participate in the
proposal-drafting process. The United States permits the exclusive
filing of proposals by debtors only within the first 120 days of
bankruptcy, but after the expiration of this time period, creditors are

116. See Cook, supra note 1, at 104.
117. Compare Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act § 69 (Can.) with 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994).
For more background on stays of proceedings in bankruptcy cases in Canada and the United
States, see generally Cook, supra note 1, at 104. While Crown claims are expressly and absolutely exempted from being stayed, see Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act § 69 (Can.), U.S. government claims are only exempt in certain circumstances, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a); cf. 11 U.S.C. §
362(b) (1994). See also Cook, supra note 1, at 104, 106. Common legal ground is the fact that
stays of proceeding are subject to judicial review. Compare Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act §
69.5 (Can.) with 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362(d) (1994).
118. See Cook, supra note 1, at 105, 106.
119. See id. at 105.
120. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d), 507(b) (1994).
121. See Cook, supra note 1, at 106.
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able to file proposals independently.122 In contrast, Canada permits
creditors only to approve or reject negotiated reorganizations123 but
similar to U.S. law, receivers, trustees, and liquidators may submit
proposals in Canada.124 Although the plurality required to approve
reorganization proposals differs numerically in each country,125 both
Canadian and U.S. insolvency legislation mandate that creditors
approve of proposals by vote and specify the technical requirements
for them to be duly authorized. Creditors may be separated into
classes for voting purposes in both jurisdictions.126
In terms of authority, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides a
method by which proposals may be approved despite their rejection
by a class of creditors.127 While Canadian bankruptcy legislation is
void of parallel “cram down” procedures, a similar principle does exist in Canada at common law.128 Classes of secured creditors who reject proposals or who are not addressed in the proposal’s provisions
are not stayed from recovery of their collateral from debtors.129
“The law regarding approval of a reorganization plan will likely
present the largest obstacle to reaching a [bilateral treaty]. . .because
Canada. . .and the United States have five reorganization provisions. . .fraught with technical and substantive differences.”130 Despite
the predominant consistency of ideologies, approaches and purposes—if not always in the specific statutory formation—of Canadian
and U.S. insolvency law, the similarities in bankruptcy law as the basis

122. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b), (c) (1994).
123. See Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, §§ 4, 5.
124. See Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C., ch. C-3 § 50(1) (1992) (Can.).
125. Compare Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act § 54 (Can.) with 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1994).
The United States requires that more than half of the creditors in each class, representing at
least two-thirds of the total value of the claims, accept the plan, see 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1994),
while Canada requires acceptance of a proposal by a majority of the claimants representing only
two-thirds of the value of the claims in each class, see Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act § 54
(Can.).
126. Compare Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act § 50(1.4) (Can.) with 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a)
(1994). Canada uses a “commonality of debt interests” to define voting classes, and the United
States employs a test of substantial similarity of claim. See id.
127. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1994).
128. Canadian courts have been willing to allow a debtor under the BIA to redistribute dissenting creditors into larger classes of similar claims in order to reduce their influence over approval of the plan. See Leonard & Marantz, supra note 2, at 309-314; E. Bruce Leonard & Fasken C. Godfrey, Commercial Reorganizations Under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act –
Canada, A.B.A. INST. ON MULTINATIONAL COM. INSOLVENCY F-1, F-8 (1993).
129. See Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C., ch. C-3 § 69.1 (1992) (Can.), amended by
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C., ch. 26, § 8 (1994) (Can.).
130. Cook, supra note 1, at 109.
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for a future bilateral convention are undermined by the contemporary reality of each national system’s inherent mal-administration,
misapplication and non-enforcement.
C. Current Problems and Past Solutions
Despite the increasingly universal approach to bilateral insolvency reflecting the consistencies in Canadian and U.S. law that has
been identified in recent decisions of the U.S. courts,131 territorial considerations continue to determine most treatments of contemporary
transnational insolvency proceedings.132 The rules of application of
bankruptcy law in Canada and the United States remain vague and
inconsistent, with the majority of contemporary insolvency settlement
agreements containing both universal and territorial concepts approved by a territoriality-oriented judiciary.133 While possibly an impediment to the eventual establishment of a Canada-U.S. insolvency
convention, the contemporary disarray of bankruptcy affairs between
Canada and the United States demonstrates the necessity of a formal,
bilateral insolvency agreement. The two countries have been cognizant of this unseemly state of insolvency affairs between them, because in 1979 a bilateral agreement on cross-border insolvency—as
alluded to previously—was drafted to promote reform.134 Response
to the proposed Canada-U.S. treaty, however, has been negative and
it remains unratified to this day.
The Canada-U.S. treaty proposed a single, transnational administration of insolvency proceedings under the law of the nation in
which the bankrupt retained the greater value of its assets at the time
of the filing.135 The courts of the administering country would apply
national law to all aspects of the proceeding, including matters over
which the courts of the opposite nation would normally exercise jurisdiction;136 national courts in the other country would have jurisdiction ancillary to the main proceedings in order to aid the court in the
administering country.137 The draft Canada-U.S. treaty implemented
an automatic stay of proceedings in both countries upon the bank-

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See Booth, supra note 104, at 186-87.
See Kim & Smith, supra note 53, at 4-5.
See Cook, supra note 1, at 116.
See generally United States of America – Canada Bankruptcy Treaty, supra note 21.
See id. art. 6(1).
See id. art. 15(1).
See id. art. 14(3).
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rupt’s filing a petition in either jurisdiction138 and the powers of trustees and debtors-in-possession in both the main and ancillary proceedings were to be determined by the laws of the nation of main forum.139
Antagonism toward the adoption of the bilateral treaty surrounded its prohibitions on the application of local law in ancillary
proceedings and on its inability to ensure the stability of the proceedings generally.140 Other criticisms addressed restrictions preventing courts from applying national law and the flexibility of the
“location of assets” test that forces creditors to gamble on which
country has jurisdiction over bankruptcy proceedings.141 Neither
Canada nor the United States have ratified the Canada-U.S. treaty;142
the treaty was concluded prior to Canada’s most recent reformation
of its bankruptcy laws and was dismissed by the U.S. courts without
explanation in its first instance of judicial consideration.143 As a result,
the draft Canada-U.S. treaty has been dubbed a negative model for
future agreements.144 Despite this indictment, the common ground
found in the formation of the Canada-U.S. treaty may be emphasized
to push for renewing a cross-border insolvency regime this century.
D. A Possible Preliminary Model
Toward a Canada-U.S. insolvency convention, a modified universal jurisdiction akin to that embodied in the Concordat would be
not only necessary given the lessons of the past and the primacy of jurisdictional sovereignty but also desirable for expediency. Most Ca138. See id. art. 13(1).
139. See id. arts. 3, 15(2).
140. Creditors could not predict with certainty which country would assume jurisdiction in
each case due to the flexibility and indeterminacy of the “location of assets” test. See Somers,
supra note 60, at 677, 699 n.154 (1991). For a more detailed critique of the Canada-U.S. Treaty,
see Kurt H. Nadelmann, A Reflection on Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: News from the European
Common Market, the United States and Canada, 27 MCGILL L.J. 541, 550 (1982).
141. See Cook, supra note 1, at 96.
142. See id., at 95.
143. The draft agreement was rejected without explanation in its one instance of judicial
consideration. See in re Toga Mfg. Ltd., 28 B.R. 165, 169-70 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.) (1983). In this
case, the trustee of a Canadian bankrupt company subject to bankruptcy proceedings in Canada
petitioned the state court under section 304 of the Code, for a stay of proceedings by a U.S.
creditor attempting to enforce its judgment in Michigan. The Court rejected the provisions of
the Canada-U.S. bankruptcy treaty which provided for automatic and universal stays of proceedings against corporations that have filed for bankruptcy and held that, despite the Treaty’s
provision, comity warranted the rejection of the Canadian trustee’s petition for a stay of proceedings. See id.
144. See Cook, supra note 1, at 95-96.
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nadian and U.S. corporations maintain an identifiable headquarters
and many of their assets in one country, and the assignment of a primary jurisdiction would enhance control of assets, increase business
values, and ensure the fair treatment of creditors.145 The unpredictable “location of assets” test for the determination of the jurisdiction
of the main forum, fatally proposed in the Canada-U.S. treaty, would
be abandoned in favor of a functional approach.146 The EU and Istanbul Conventions assign jurisdiction by means of a rebuttable presumption that jurisdiction over the main bankruptcy proceeding vests
with the state that hosts the bankrupt’s registered office.147 Is this
method of juridical advantage equitable given that a legal fiction
would be created, for example, in every instance that a significant
proportion of a Canadian company’s assets remain in Canada while
its official headquarters are registered in the United States?
In this circumstance, the United States would obtain jurisdiction
over the bankruptcy proceeding, and the creditors closest geographically and legally to the company’s assets would be required to submit
to a foreign—albeit standardized—judicial body for the main proceeding. Given this result, the criticisms of the current state of bankruptcy relations between Canada and the United States—inconvenience, excessive costs, and suspicions of bias—would again resurface.
On balance, however, the propriety of the Concordat model is affirmed, because its retention of national, ancillary proceedings counteracts the hazards to ratification of universal proceedings inherent in
the single forum model.148

145. See Report on the Concordat, supra note 61, at 3.
146. The location of assets is a pivotal issue in the negotiation of a Canada-U.S. Insolvency
Convention apart from its being a test for jurisdiction of proceedings. Canada must always be
vigilant as to its comparative disadvantage in the greater volume and diversification of the assets
of U.S. corporations relative to the holdings of Canadian businesses. While many Canadian
firms have the majority of their assets in the United States, U.S. companies with substantial assets in Canada are more likely than Canadian businesses to have equally substantial assets
abroad, inaccessible to Canadian creditors under a bilateral convention. Perhaps a Canada-U.S.
convention would be restricted to govern corporations doing business and retaining assets exclusively in the two countries, but given the increasing globalization of commerce, how many
companies would be governed by the convention in the next decade? How would a CanadaU.S. convention deal with an American company with offices and substantial assets in Canada,
but also with creditors abroad? Would this not require multilateralism in any treaty on insolvency between Canada and the United States? Increasingly significant substantive and conceptually difficult issues of international and insolvency law arise when the details of an actual bilateral bankruptcy convention are explored.
147. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 68, art. 2(1); Istanbul Convention, supra note 29, art.
4(1).
148. See Report on the Concordat, supra note 61, princ. 1.
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In addition to the Concordat, the MIICA is also a valuable resource for an insolvency convention between Canada and the United
States for it embodies many of the features a Canada-U.S. instrument
should seek to avoid. When the MIICA was first proposed, Canada
was concerned that it contained terms from the U.S. Code that were
without equivalent in Canada’s B.I.A.149 Other Canadian difficulties
with the MIICA included its provisions on reorganization,150 treatment of foreign revenue, and inclusion of a bilateral treaty alternative. Due to the MIICA’s universal approach, Canada also had reservations about the status and priority of local creditors, the degree of
discretion it delegated to local courts, the effect of variations of the
MIICA’s provisions under local adaptations, and its dichotomous
treatment of common and civil law traditions.151 The MIICA’s provisions on foreign recognition did not reflect those in the U.S. Code sufficiently for its acceptance by the United States.152 While a modified
universality approach would alleviate the concerns over the treatment
of local creditors, which doomed the MIICA, a bilateral convention
would not encounter duplicity in legal traditions or variation under
local conditions given the cultural and demographic consistency of
Canada and the United States. Despite this consistency, matters of
judicial discretion and preference to local creditors, however, remain
barriers to a bilateral agreement.153
Just as judicial discretion has been identified as a source of the
dysfunction of contemporary Canada-U.S. bankruptcy relations,
ironically, delegation of ancillary jurisdiction to national courts under
a modified universal cross-border treaty would return judicial discretion to a position of influence. Weariness of judicial preferences
given to local creditors by courts that either fail to enforce insolvency
agreements or create exceptions in applying the agreements has been
an eternal barrier to the conclusion of international insolvency con149. See generally Somers, supra note 60, at 695.
150. Canada’s Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act is centered on progressive and effective reorganization provisions. See Leonard & Marantz, supra note 2, at 300, 304. “An increasing number of small and moderate-sized corporate debtors are taking advantage of the new liberalized
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act procedures.” Id. at 304.
151. See Somers, supra note 60, at 695.
152. Canada was concerned that the MIICA contained terms from the Code that had no
meaning in Canada and did not sufficiently address difficulties with reorganizations, reconcile
the dichotomy of common and civil law concepts or clearly defeat a bilateral treaty alternative,
see Somers, supra note 60, at 695, while the United States was predicted to reject the MIICA for
not copying section 304 of the Code, see Powers, supra note 60, at 697; Westbrook, supra note
60, at 485.
153. See Booth, supra note 104, at 135.
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ventions.154 Canadian and U.S. judges that would enforce a bankruptcy treaty between the two countries should therefore participate
in its drafting in order to strike an enforceable balance between uniform, bilateral cooperation and the protection of both countries’ local
creditors.155 This judicial participation would create a treaty readily
applicable in a fair and equitable manner by the countries’ judiciaries.
While none of the provisions of a Canada-U.S. treaty would be
beyond criticism, the inclusion of an automatic stay of proceedings
would be as close to an innocuous feature as any capable of being
presented. A universal stay of proceeding as characteristic of any
Canada-U.S. insolvency convention would avoid Canadian and U.S.
creditors from dismantling businesses upon their filing for bankruptcy, and creditors would not be required to line up at the border
for access to foreign courts to protect their claims. Stays would not be
indefinite but would depend upon the bankrupt’s good faith in the
negotiation of its financial restructuring, which is how stays exist under Canadian and U.S. national bankruptcy law. The stay of proceedings would be a workable inclusion in a bilateral insolvency convention as neither Canada nor the United States would have an
advantage over the other country.156
In terms of resolving the disputes bound to arise regarding the
interpretation and implementation of the terms of a Canada-U.S. insolvency convention, the dispute settlement mechanism contained
within the NAFTA accord could be invoked with the automatic stay
of proceedings preserved pending determination of the dispute under
NAFTA’s provisions.157 While this model would be fast and impartial
as neither Canada nor the United States would determine the outcomes of the disputes, its availability as an avenue of redress is ultimately dependent upon an agreement between Canada and United
States to respect the dispute panels’ decisions.158 Given the success of
dispute resolution under the NAFTA accord159 and the obligation of
154. See Cook, supra note 1, at 91-93. Evidence of the problems inherent in enacting bankruptcy agreements due to concern over judicial preferences exists in the histories of the Montevideo Treaty and Bustamente Code. See id.
155. See id. at 93.
156. See id. at 121.
157. Section 11 of NAFTA provides a mechanism for the resolution of investment disputes
while § 14 is designed to resolve disputes involving financial matters. See NAFTA, supra note
18, at §§ 11, 14.
158. Canada and the United States have been historically willing to submit treaty disputes to
panels following failed attempts at private resolution. See id. at 121.
159. See Bialos & Siegel, supra note 101, at 604-12.
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Canada and the United States to honor their resolutions to follow this
agreement, treaty disputes arising from a bilateral bankruptcy convention could be resolved by this pre-existing North American institution,160 precluding the need for a dispute settlement mechanism
within a concluded Canada-U.S. convention.
IV. CONCLUSION
Advocacy of an insolvency convention between Canada and the
United States is tense with fundamental inconsistencies. While the
differences in the bankruptcy laws of the two countries indicate the
need for a harmonized, bilateral regime, they also indicate that a
common approach at treaty law may prove ultimately unsuccessful.
The degree of similarity between Canadian and U.S. bankruptcy laws
invites optimism toward a cross-border agreement but simultaneously
suggests a lack of need for an insolvency convention if the two countries’ laws are indeed so similar. The necessity of a bilateral treaty is
further undermined by the reality that Canada and the United States
may already be subject to the principles of international customary
bankruptcy law without the existence of a convention. Furthermore,
judicial activism has been portrayed both as a detriment to the contemporary arrangements of cross-border insolvency between Canada
and the United States due to the seemingly ad hoc approach of justices and as an asset for preserving jurisdictional sovereignty in an
otherwise universal process. The perception of bankruptcy judges as
intolerably preferential to local creditors or guardians is a function of
ideology. Perhaps much of the incompatibility of bankruptcy proceedings in Canada and the United States has to do with judicial activism more than substantive variance in legal regimes,161 and what is
really required is standardization of cross-border approaches to insolvency adjudication rather than the harmonization of substantive
bankruptcy laws.
Accordingly, why not simply amend already similar domestic
laws and implement proactive measures that promote judicial coordination within the current provisions? Do not the similarities of Canadian and U.S. bankruptcy law outweigh the superficial distinction
sufficient to demonstrate a lack of need for a convention regardless of
its feasibility? Why put forth the extensive international legal effort
160. See Cook, supra note 1, at 118 (Canada-US convention would be most effective following the dispute settlement mechanisms of the FAA, GATT, and NAFTA).
161. See id. at 109 (implying a degree of judicial responsibility in transnational bankruptcy
conflicts).
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for a bilateral convention, given the plagued history of bilateral insolvency agreements?162 Perhaps the similarities of law and the emerging
trend toward modified universality at customary international law are
sufficient to preclude the necessity of a treaty. In fact, a cross-border
insolvency accord may be less desirable in many ways due to the conceptual and procedural difficulties inherent in bankruptcy treaties,
and, perhaps, a concerted bilateral effort aimed merely at fine-tuning
the law and its modes of judicial application via minor adjustments is
warranted. These issues are valid questions and the fundamental contradictions in the Canada-U.S. context will ensure that any renewed
negotiations toward a cross-border accord will be a cautious, narrow,
and inherently contestable—if not ultimately imperfect—endeavor.
The general utility of NAFTA for promoting insolvency collusion between Canada and the United States cannot be underestimated. The overall success of NAFTA, in contrast to the general
failure of conventional bankruptcy agreements, may indicate that a
Canada-U.S. bankruptcy convention would be more susceptible to
success were it to follow the dispute resolution trend and spirit of bilateralism characteristic of the FAA, GATT, and NAFTA. Whatever the approach preferred to pursue the harmonization of Canadian
and U.S. bankruptcy laws for cross-border purposes and the degree to
which collusion is sought, the need is current and the model of a bilateral convention valid.
Meaningful transnational insolvency conventions are exceedingly
difficult to conclude. The few instruments currently in force tend to
give undue preferences to local creditors, and although Canada and
the United States have recently expanded their bankruptcy laws
within their parallel legal traditions, issues of territoriality and failures
to capitalize on the inherent similarities of their processes present
formidable challenges to the drafters of a Canada-U.S. insolvency
convention. From these foundational difficulties, a bankruptcy convention between Canada and the United States must be pursued. The
time is now to bring order to the cross-border insolvency chaos that
currently exists and that contrasts to the highly ordered and increasingly harmonized financial arrangements which otherwise characterize Canada-U.S. economic relations at the beginning of the 21st century.
Mike Perry

162. See Fletcher, Case Study, supra note 29, at 437.

